Exact inference of marginals in probabilistic graphical models (PGM) is known to be intractable, necessitating the use of approximate methods. Most of the existing variational techniques perform iterative message passing in loopy graphs which is slow to converge for many benchmarks. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for marginal inference that is based on the incremental build-infer-approximate (IBIA) paradigm. Our algorithm converts the PGM into a sequence of linked clique tree forests (SLCTF) with bounded clique sizes, and then uses a heuristic belief update algorithm to infer the marginals. For the special case of Bayesian networks, we show that if the incremental build step in IBIA uses the topological order of variables then (a) the prior marginals are consistent in all CTFs in the SLCTF and (b) the posterior marginals are consistent once all evidence variables are added to the SLCTF. In our approach, the belief propagation step is non-iterative and the accuracy-complexity trade-off is controlled using user-defined clique size bounds. Results for several benchmark sets from recent UAI competitions show that our method gives either better or comparable accuracy than existing variational and sampling based methods, with smaller runtimes.

As multi-agent systems are increasingly utilized for reasoning and decision-making applications, there is a greater need for LLM-based agents to have something resembling propositional beliefs. One simple method for doing so is to include statements describing beliefs maintained in the prompt space (in what we'll call their belief boxes). But when agents have such statements in belief boxes, how does it actually affect their behaviors and dispositions towards those beliefs? And does it significantly affect agents' ability to be persuasive in multi-agent scenarios? Likewise, if the agents are given instructions to be open-minded, how does that affect their behaviors? We explore these and related questions in a series of experiments. Our findings confirm that instructing agents to be open-minded affects how amenable they are to belief change. We show that incorporating belief statements and their strengths influences an agent's resistance to (and persuasiveness against) opposing viewpoints. Furthermore, it affects the likelihood of belief change, particularly when the agent is outnumbered in a debate by opposing viewpoints, i.e., peer pressure scenarios. The results demonstrate the feasibility and validity of the belief box technique in reasoning and decision-making tasks.

Robots operating in everyday environments must often decide when and whether to engage with people, yet such decisions often hinge on subtle nonverbal cues that unfold over time and are difficult to model explicitly. Drawing on a five-day Wizard-of-Oz deployment of a mobile service robot in a university cafe, we analyze how people signal interaction readiness through nonverbal behaviors and how expert wizards use these cues to guide engagement. Motivated by these observations, we propose a two-stage pipeline in which lightweight perceptual detectors (gaze shifts and proxemics) are used to selectively trigger heavier video-based vision-language model (VLM) queries at socially meaningful moments. We evaluate this pipeline on replayed field interactions and compare two prompting strategies. Our findings suggest that selectively using VLMs as proxies for social reasoning enables socially responsive robot behavior, allowing robots to act appropriately by attending to the cues people naturally provide in real-world interactions.

To collaborate with humans, robots must infer goals that are often ambiguous, difficult to articulate, or not drawn from a fixed set. Prior approaches restrict inference to a predefined goal set, rely only on observed actions, or depend exclusively on explicit instructions, making them brittle in real-world interactions. We present BALI (Bidirectional Action-Language Inference) for goal prediction, a method that integrates natural language preferences with observed human actions in a receding-horizon planning tree. BALI combines language and action cues from the human, asks clarifying questions only when the expected information gain from the answer outweighs the cost of interruption, and selects supportive actions that align with inferred goals. We evaluate the approach in collaborative cooking tasks, where goals may be novel to the robot and unbounded. Compared to baselines, BALI yields more stable goal predictions and significantly fewer mistakes.

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Intercepting fast moving objects, by its very nature, is challenging because of its tight time constraints. This problem becomes further complicated in the presence of sensor noise because noisy sensors provide, at best, incomplete information, which results in a distribution over target states to be intercepted. Since time is of the essence, to hit the target, the planner must begin directing the interceptor, in this case a robot arm, while still receiving information. We introduce an tree-like structure, which is grown using kinodynamic motion primitives in state-time space. This tree-like structure encodes reachability to multiple goals from a single origin, while enabling real-time value updates as the target belief evolves and seamless transitions between goals. We evaluate our framework on an interception task on a 6 DOF industrial arm (ABB IRB-1600) with an onboard stereo camera (ZED 2i). A robust Innovation-based Adaptive Estimation Adaptive Kalman Filter (RIAE-AKF) is used to track the target and perform belief updates.

The idea of using belief bases as formal semantics for multi-agent epistemic logic was first introduced in [26] and further developed in [27, 28]. This approach aligns with the sentential (or syntactic) perspective on knowledge representation [21, 13, 33, 20], which holds th at an agent's body of knowledge should be represented as a set of sentences in a formal language. The key novelty of belief base semantics, compared to traditional epistemic logic semantics based on multi-relational Kripke models [31, 12], lies in two main aspects. First, a possible world (or state) in a mo del is not treated as a primitive entity but is instead composed of the agents' belief bases and a valu ation of propositional atoms. Second, the agents' accessibility relations are not explicitly par t of the model but are determined a posteriori from their belief bases.

The principle of minimal change in belief revision theory requires that, when accepting new information, one keeps one's belief state as close to the initial belief state as possible. This is precisely what the method known as minimal revision does. However, unlike less conservative belief revision methods, minimal revision falls short in learning power: It cannot learn everything that can be learned by other learning methods. We begin by showing that, despite this limitation, minimal revision is still a successful learning method in a wide range of situations. Firstly, it can learn any problem that is finitely identifiable. Secondly, it can learn with positive and negative data, as long as one considers finitely many possibilities. We then characterize the prior plausibility assignments (over finitely many possibilities) that enable one to learn via minimal revision, and do the same for conditioning and lexicographic upgrade. Finally, we show that not all of our results still hold when learning from possibly erroneous information.

The primates appear to change their minds based on the strength of evidence, just like humans. Breakthroughs, discoveries, and DIY tips sent every weekday. The human capacity for rational thinking makes us unique among the animal kingdom, according to wise, old Aristotle . However, an ever-growing body of research suggests that rationality might not be quite as distinctive a human quality as we might have thought. In a study recently published in the journal, researchers at the Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary in Uganda presented chimpanzees with two boxes: one with food and one without a snack.

State resetting is a fundamental but often overlooked capability of simulators. It supports sample-based planning by allowing resets to previously encountered simulation states, and enables calibration of simulators using real data by resetting to states observed in real-system traces. While often taken for granted, state resetting in complex simulators can be nontrivial: when the simulator comes with latent variables (states), state resetting requires sampling from the posterior over the latent state given the observable history, a.k.a. the belief state (Silver and Veness, 2010). While exact sampling is often infeasible, many approximate belief-state samplers can be constructed, raising the question of how to select among them using only sampling access to the simulator. In this paper, we show that this problem reduces to a general conditional distribution-selection task and develop a new algorithm and analysis under sampling-only access. Building on this reduction, the belief-state selection problem admits two different formulations: latent state-based selection, which directly targets the conditional distribution of the latent state, and observation-based selection, which targets the induced distribution over the observation. Interestingly, these formulations differ in how their guarantees interact with the downstream roll-out methods: perhaps surprisingly, observation-based selection may fail under the most natural roll-out method (which we call Single-Reset) but enjoys guarantees under the less conventional alternative (which we call Repeated-Reset). Together with discussion on issues such as distribution shift and the choice of sampling policies, our paper reveals a rich landscape of algorithmic choices, theoretical nuances, and open questions, in this seemingly simple problem.